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CRAFTING THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: TRIALS AND
TRIBULATIONS IN ARTICLE 98(2)
Chimene Keitzer"
This Comment explores the tension between "consistency"
and "consensus" in international treaty-making byfocusing on
negotiations surrounding the International Criminal Court. It
traces the controversy over a particular jurisdictional provision
in the ICC's founding treay, the Rome Statute, during the Fifth
meeting of the ICC's Preparatory Commission. ien the tat
of the Rome Statute was approved in 1998, the Preparatory
Commission was created to propose guidelines for the ICC's
implementation and operation, including the Elements of
Crimes and the Rules ofProcedure and Evidence. Although the
Preparatory Commission's mandate required it to conform at
all times to the parameters established in the Rome Statute, the
PrepCom meetings nevertheless witnessed attempts by
countries not satisfied with the agreement reached at Rome to
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try and modify certain provisions of the Statute. One example
of this tactic was the effort by the United States to create a rule
that would have placed further restrictions on the ICC's ability
to try an individual from a State not Party to the Rome Statute
for committing war crimes, genocide, or crimes against
humanity on the territory of a State Party.
The goals of this Comment are threefold: first, to provide a
descriptive account of the negotiations surrounding the U.S.
Rule; second, to offer a legal analysis of the U.S. Rule that was
ultimately adopted and show why this rule cannot be
interpreted as creating an additional loophole for avoiding ICC
jurisdiction; and third, to advance a normative argument about
the U.S. 's attitude towards and involvement with the future ICC.
The crux of this normative argument is that making allowances
for the preeminent position of the U.S. in international politics
should not entail creating exceptions for U.S. citizens from
international standards, not just because of principle
(universality of the obligation to refrain from committing war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity), but also
because of pragmatic concerns (maintaining U.S. credibility
and legitimacy as a team player in the international arena).
This Comment ultimately warns against the dangers of
excessive emphasis on achieving consensus in international
treaty-making by accommodating the demands of intransigent
states at the expense of consistency with human rights and
humanitarian standards, thereby threatening to undermine the
creation of a robust and effective international legal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The dilemma of building agreement among State Parties without
diluting core principles often colors the process of international treaty-
making. This challenge can be conceptualized as a trade-off betwc~n
achieving consistency and building consensus. The tension betwcon
consistency and consensus in international treaty-making is arguably
becoming more pronounced, particularly in international human rights
law and in the growing field of international criminal law. This may
be so in part because those who violate humanitarian and human rights
standards are becoming increasingly vulnerable to prosecution at the
national and international levels.I
In this evolving international environment, concepts such as State
inviolability and sovereign immunity, which were formerly taken for
granted in international relations and international law, are
increasingly subject to scrutiny and to contextual qualification. True,
States still drive the elaboration and entrenchment of international
1 See, eg., Regina v. Bartle ew parle Pinochet, reprintcd in 38 LLM. 581, available at
http://%vv.'%v. parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uklpald19999ldjudgmtjd990324,"pnol htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2001); Statute of the International Tribunal, UN Secretaly-Gencr-il s
Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per uns
Responsible for Serious Violations qf International Humanitarian Law Committcd in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Security Council, Annex, UN Doc. S125704
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY]; Statute of the
International Tribunal, Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955,
U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. SIResi955 (1994), reprintcd in 33
I.L.M. 159S, 1602 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR].
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legal standards. However, the "expansion of international society"
2
and the penetration of domestic legal and political systems by
international norms3 have influenced the negotiating environment in
which State delegations operate, leading to coalition-building among
traditionally less powerful countries as well as greater potential
participation by non-State actors, such as Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs). Thus, in both formal and informal
negotiations, State players now face a new game or, at least, a less
predictable one.
Just how new and unpredictable a game this is, is being discovered
and determined by negotiations such as those for the Rules of
Procedure (Rules) and the Elements of Crimes (Elements) for the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC is a permanent
international court established to try individuals for war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Like the existing International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the ICC will be based in the Hague; however,
unlike the ICJ, the ICC is not an organ of the United Nations.4
Furthermore, while the ICJ's mandate is to arbitrate disputes between
States, the ICC will be charged with trying individuals for the most
serious international crimes, when States that have jurisdiction are
unwilling or unable to conduct a fair and genuine trial. Because it is
the product of an international agreement, the ICC is not a "foreign"
court, but rather an independent judicial body composed of legal
experts from member States and governed by rules and procedures
that member States elaborate and monitor.
5
2 This phrase is borrowed from the title of THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
(Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984).
3 See, e.g., Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996)
(presenting a theory of how international norms become embedded in domestic legal
systems).
4 Despite the common perception that the ICC is a UN Court, the ICC is an independent
judicial organization, unlike the International Court of Justice (a principal organ of the UN),
or the ad hoc tribunals (special organs created by the Security Council under chapter VII of
the UN Charter). The ICC will be funded in part by UN contributions, but it will not
otherwise be connected to or dependent upon the UN, except to the extent that certain forms
of cooperation, such as sharing personnel, information, or resources, prove mutually
beneficial.
5 This observation accounts in part for the difference between "surrender" of an individual
to the ICC and "extradition" to a foreign country. See infra note 27.
Crafting the International Criminal Court 219
The founding treaty for the ICC is the Rome Statute,"b which v, as
adopted at an international conference in Rome in July 1998. The
adoption of the Statute for the ICC seemed to mark the end of a long
process that began as early as 1948, when the idea of a permancnt
court with jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes v,,as
introduced.7 In fact, Rome was just the beginning. Since then, six
meetings of the ICC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) have been
held to formulate the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the
Elements of Crimes that will guide ICC judges and personnel. The
way in which these documents are formulated, and the understandings
with which they are adopted, will ultimately give the ICC's judges
more or less discretion in interpreting their own jurisdiction and
capacities.
The tension between consistency and consensus has colored the
crafting of the ICC in many ways. The PrepCom's mandate requires
that its results conform to the Rome Statute, which defines the
jurisdiction of the ICC in fairly certain terms.3 All Rules and Elements
for the ICC must be consistent with the Statute.! However, despite this
legal requirement of consistency with the Statute, the PrepCom
negotiations are also subject to another, sometimes contradictory
6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N, Doc. ACONF.1830 (July 17,
1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http:/;'%,4iw.un orgllawiccJstatutelromeffa htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Rome Statute] One hundred and tventy States votcd
to adopt the Rome Statute. The Statute will come into effect upon reaching sixty ratifications.
For the current ratification status, see http:/iv.,ge.org/icc!romeihtmlratify-html ilLut
modified Feb. 8, 2001).
7 On December 9, 1948, the General Assembly, "[r]ecognizing that at all periods of hi!!tor
genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to libcrate
mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required," adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, GA Res. 2601111),
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A 810 (194S), 78 U.N.TS. 277 (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951). Article I of the convention characterizes genocide as "a crime urier
international law," and Article VI provides that persons charged with genocide "shall bh tried
by a competent tribunal of the State in the terrtorx, of which the act %,as committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction." Id
8 Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 11-13.
9 This point was emphasized by Chairman Philippe Kirseh in his opening Address to the
Fifth PrepCom (June 12,2000). This requirement ofconsistency, and the authoritativene:; of
the Statute in cases of conflict with the Rules or Elements, is codified in the Rome Statute,
supra note 6, art. 51(5).
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impulse: the political importance of building consensus. The desire
for consensus during the PrepCom negotiations has fueled efforts to
accommodate the demands of particular States, arguably at the
expense of consistency with human rights and humanitarian principles.
The PrepCom plays an important role in setting the stage for the
ICC in a number of ways beyond the simple production of documents.
First, the PrepCom meetings provide a forum for delegations to send
signals to each other about their respective attitudes towards the ICC,
with the potential for bolstering or circumscribing general support for
this institution. Second, the PrepCom negotiations and their outcomes
have an important demonstration effect for national capitals, both
symbolically and substantively, as countries move towards ratifying
and implementing the Rome Statute, a process that will culminate in
the creation of the ICC. t0
The Bureau of the PrepCom has made achieving the broadest
possible consensus in the negotiations on Rules and Elements a high
priority. It has done so in part with a view to the longer-term goal of
creating and maintaining a successful ICC. During the Fifth
PrepCom, this desire for consensus involved preserving a much wider
margin of appreciation in interpreting the Rome Statute (so that certain
delegations' proposals could be construed as consistent with it) than
many observers and participants seemed to feel was warranted." True,
a strong Court may be one with the largest number of States Parties.
However, this will only be the case if gaining the support of parties
does not involve sinking to the lowest common denominator of
principles. In particular, as will be explored below, the ever-present
"threat" of calling a vote to resolve disagreements proved a powerful
to The ICC will come into existence upon the 60th State ratification, Rome Statute supra
note 6. As of this writing, 139 States had signed the Rome Statute, and 28 States had ratified.
Ratification Status as of February 12, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2001).
11 The willingness of delegations to voice their hesitation was somewhat tempered by U.S.
Ambassador David Scheffer's response to the first round of comments on the proposed U.S.
rule to article 98(2). Ambassador Scheffer referred to those countries that had expressed
concerns simply by saying: "I know who you are." David Scheffer, Intervention in the ICC
PrepCom Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence (June 23, 2000). The
weightiness of this seemingly offhand comment during the working group meeting testifies to
the tremendous diplomatic presence of the U.S. in the PrepCom negotiations.
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lever for certain States to strong-arm proposals that might not
otherwise have been accepted. Allowing a few intransigent States to
exploit the aversion to voting (a process considered divisive despite its
democratic credentials) to foist their preferences on a reluctant but
conciliatory majority could ultimately result in the creation of an ICC
with severely curtailed powers to indict, secure custody of, and try
individuals responsible for serious international crimes that national
courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute - an institution far from
that envisaged and agreed upon at Rome.
This potentially dangerous dynamic was particularly evident in the
Fifth PrepCom's negotiations on the Rules of Procedure.'" Thirteen
States had ratified the Rome Statute by the end of the Fifth PrepCom,
meaning that the majority of delegations to the meeting were from
States that had not yet ratified -- in fact, one of the most vocal
delegations was from a State that had not yet signed: the United States.
In the end, the United States did sign the Rome Statute, a few hours
before the signature deadline on December 31, 2000.13 (While signing
prohibits a country from doing anything to undermine the Rome
Statute,14 only ratification would make the U.S. a party to the Statute,
and hence a member of the ICC.) Once the Rome Statute goes into
effect (shortly after the sixtieth ratification), negotiations will move to
the Assembly of States Parties. Until that time, all States participating
in the PrepCom are working to influence the shape of the future Court,
with more or less regard for the principles and parameters established
at Rome.
In the meetings of the Working Group on Rules during the Fifth
PrepCom, the attention of State delegations engaged in negotiations,
and NGOs observing and seeking to inform the debates, focused
largely on one provision: a proposed rule put forth by the U.S.
delegation to clarify its interpretation of article 98(2) of the Rome
Statute relating to international agreements. The proposed rule, which
was adopted in modified form by the PrepCom, forms part of an
12 These negotiations took place at the UN headquarters in New York on June 12-30, 2(:A
13 See Clinton Statement on Signature of the Intcrnational Criminal Court Trcati , U S.
NEwswIRE, Jan. 1, 2001, available in LEXIS, Newvs Group File.
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, U.N, Doc. A!Conf
39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in S I.L.M. 679, 6S6.
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avowed and ongoing U.S. campaign (despite the U.S. signature) to
ensure that no U.S. national will be subject to the ICC's jurisdiction as
long as the U.S. remains a non-Party to the Statute.
The U.S. has a complex relationship to the ICC. The U.S. has
traditionally been an enthusiastic proponent of the international
prosecution of war criminals, most recently in its backing of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda. 15 However, this enthusiasm is decidedly uni-directional:
while the U.S. has, in many instances, supported institutions involving
some form of international jurisdiction (for example, the two ad hoc
criminal tribunals, and the innovative Scottish tribunal convened in the
Hague to try the two Libyans accused of bombing PanAm flight 103),
the Pentagon and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
particular have expressed vehement opposition to any exercise of
international jurisdiction over citizens of the United States. 16 This
Comment argues that continued attempts by the U.S. to exercise moral
leadership in international affairs will be compromised severely by
perceptions by other States and international actors that the U.S. will
not subject itself to the standards and enforcement mechanisms it
imposes on others. While the last-minute signing of the Rome Statute
by the United States is a step in the right direction, continued political
opposition to the ICC and plans to thwart the ICC's effective operation
are contrary to the U.S. interest in maintaining its own credibility, and
to the broader goal of ensuring a minimum degree of individual
accountability for the most serious international crimes.
The process of adopting the proposed U.S. rule to article 98(2)
during the Fifth PrepCom illustrates the frequent difficulty in
international treaty negotiations of avoiding polarization while
creating a meaningful and encompassing international legal regime.
In this way, the conundrum of "consistency vs. consensus" poses a
15 See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
6 For example, Senator Jesse Helms has maintained the position that any Statute for the
ICC that does not include a veto for Washington on the exercise of jurisdiction over U.S.
citizens will be "dead on arrival" if submitted for ratification to the Senate. James Bone, US
seeks to limit war crimes court, TIMES (London), March 30, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Group File, All. See also infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing U.S
isolationism).
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continuing challenge to the development and enforcement of a
meaningful regime of international criminal law. This Comment
explores the negotiations over the proposed U.S. rule, suggesting the
implications of a preoccupation with consensus (as opposed to some
form of supermajority principle) for the effectiveness of the ICC. It
cautions that short-term accommodation of the demands of
intransigent States should not be privileged at the expense of longer-
term viability, since an effective ICC is ultimately more likely to
secure continuing support and cooperation from States than an unduly
curtailed one -- an insight relevant both to future PrepCom meetings
and to the Assembly of States Parties. 17 In addition, this Comment
anticipates potential arguments for avoiding accountability before the
ICC based on the rule to article 98(2), and it indicates the appropriate
legal responses to such attempts.
The argument proceeds in five parts. Part II analyzes the
provisions in the Rome Statute relating to "competition" between a
request by a State for the extradition of an individual and a request by
the ICC for the surrender of the same individual. The proposed U.S.
rule seeks to impose restrictions on the ability of the ICC to request
the surrender of an individual beyond those envisaged in the Rome
Statute. Part II sets out the relevant statutory provisions as a backdrop
for examining and evaluating the U.S. rule. Part III presents the U.S.
position and discusses the motivations and objectives underlying the
proposed rule. It addresses the domestic political context in the
United States and shows how the proposed rule exemplifies the
paradoxical U.S. desire to be actively involved in shaping the ICC
while keeping its citizens and soldiers firmly beyond the reach of the
ICC's jurisdiction. Part IV provides an account of the negotiations
over the proposed rule during the Fifth PrepCom, both as part of an
17 The Assembly of States Parties will set the budget for and oversee the %%ork of the ICC
See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pt. 11. Criticisms of the perceived ineffectiveness of the
ad hoc tribunals, and especially of the ICTR, reinforce the idea that a stronger, not a %, 0:.2er,
ICC is ultimately more likely to earn respect and support See, eg, Jean Baptiste Kayigamba,
Rwanda - Human Rights: Not Much Love for the Arusha Tribunal, lNT;ER PREs5 SFv., Oct
IS, 1996, available in LEXIS, U.S. News, Combined File (explaining disillusionment of
Rwandans with slowness of ICTR); Betsy Pisik, Morld tribunal vs sovrcgn4., L
support to bring to trial foreign suspects, WASH. Tt'iES, Oct. 26, 1993, at AIS (recording
frustration at ineffectiveness caused by non-cooperation of States v,ith international tnbunl3).
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attempt to document the travaux involved in developing this rule, and
as an illustration of the give-and-take created by the dual imperatives
of consistency and consensus. The Conclusions emphasize that the
excessive privileging of consensus over consistency is a problematical
strategy, even as part of an attempt to secure U.S. participation in
international legal institutions such as the ICC.
II. NATIONAL VS. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
COMPETING REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OF A PERSON OR
SURRENDER TO THE ICC
A central question facing the drafters of the Rome Statute was the
scope of the ICC's jurisdiction. On the one hand, an international
criminal court with excessively limited jurisdiction would have little
power to deter and punish war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. On the other hand, since there is no international
government or international police force, international law depends on
the voluntary compliance of States (with incentives for compliance
shaped by a range of political, economic, and military factors). Even
though the crimes defined in the Rome Statute are a subject of
individual, rather than State, accountability, the structure of the
international legal system is such that any given individual is primarily
protected and controlled by his or her State of citizenship. In addition,
since a State's political and military personnel will often have the
greatest opportunity to perpetrate the enumerated crimes on a large
scale or with particular severity, the actions for which individuals will
be tried by the ICC will, at times, have been committed under color of
State authority. It is clear under the current state of international law
that certain heinous actions (such as torture) cannot form a legitimate
part of State policy or benefit from the protections generally accorded
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to official acts of State.'5 Nevertheless, part of the political sensitivity
surrounding the creation of the ICC is the worry that this international
institution viii encroach upon other traditional areas of State
discretion and control.
The Rome Statute embodies a carefully crafted compromise
between a State-centered idea of jurisdiction, and a more inclusive
international vision. The State-centered idea, in its extreme
manifestation, would uphold a State's exclusive jurisdiction to
prosecute and try its own citizens for war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity, and to prosecute and try citizens of other States who
commit such acts on the territory of the foram State. An inclusive
vision would promote the idea of universal jurisdiction, whereby
individuals of any nationality could be tried for certain crimes by any
State acting on behalf of humanity as a whole. The ICC follows a
middle path. The Rome Statute assigns primary jurisdiction to the
ICC's member States. However, in ratifying the Rome Statute and
becoming members of the ICC, States agree that, if they are unwilling
or unable to carry out their obligation to investigate and prosecute
these crimes, the ICC has "complementary" jurisdiction to do so in
their stead. U.S. opponents to the ICC worry that a U.S. citizen
accused of committing an enumerated crime on the territory of a State
Party to the Rome Statute might be subject to ICC jurisdiction, even if
the U.S. itself is not a Party. In other words, they are afraid that a
State Party will refuse to extradite a U.S. citizen accused of war
crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity to the U.S. for trial, and
will instead surrender that citizen to the ICC.
This section explores the jurisdictional regime of the ICC in cases
of potentially competing requests between the ICC and a State to try
the same individual for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against
humanity. It suggests that the U.S. concern, while understandable, is
largely unfounded, and it sets out some preliminary arguments about
why the U.S. rule to article 98(2) is either redundant (if interpreted in
accordance with the Rome Statute) or inoperative (if extended to
13 See, e.g, Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, reprintcd in 38 1.LM 581, arada ec at
http://v.vww.ParliamenLthe-stationery-office.co.uktpaildl99S99tdjudgmt;jd990324 pinol htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2001).
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create a barrier to jurisdiction that the Statute does not envisage or
permit).
A. Protections Afforded to States and to Defendants by the ICC
Although certain American observers have expressed concern that
the ICC's trial procedures are not identical to those employed in U.S.
courts, the ICC aspires to the highest standards, rather than the lowest
common denominator. It offers extensive procedural protections to
defendants, victims, and witnesses.1 9 The Statute also contains
provisions to account for potential national security concerns in the
investigation of conduct and the presentation of evidence.20 The fair
trial standards guaranteed by the Rome Statute exceed those of many
foreign tribunals to which criminal defendants are extradited. 2 1 In this
sense, the ICC actually gives a State party an "insurance policy"
against unfair trials of its citizens in the domestic courts of another
19 For example, see the Rome Statute arts. 67 (rights of the accused) and 68 (protection of
the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings). Rome Statute, supra
note 6, at 1004-05.
20 Id. art. 72, at 1043-44.
2' The international fair trial standards guaranteed in the Rome Statute include: the right to
be informed promptly, in detail, and in a language one understands, of the nature and cause of
the charge, see arts. 55(2)(a) (investigation), 60(1) (initial proceeding), and 67(l)(a)(trial); the
right during detention to be treated humanely and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human persons, see arts. 55(1)(b) & 106(1); the right to a hearing without undue delay, see
arts. 60(4), 61(1), 64(2), and 67(l)(c); the right to a public hearing, see arts. 64(7) and 67(l);
the right to a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law, see arts. 40 and 67(1); the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law, see arts. 66 and 67(1)(i); the right to defend oneself and to effective legal representation
of one's own choosing, without payment if one does not have sufficient means to pay for it,
see arts. 55(2)(c), 63, and 67(I)(d); the right to have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of a defense, see art. 67(1)(b); the right to obtain the attendance and examination
of witnesses, see art. 67(l)(e); the right not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt, see
arts. 55(l)(a), 65(l)(b), and 67(1)(g); the right not to be charged with or held guilty of any
criminal offense for an act or omission not constituting a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time it was committed, see art. 22; the right to appeal the judgment to
a higher administrative authority, a judicial tribunal, or both, see art. 81; and the right not to
be tried or punished again for an offence of which one has already been finally convicted or
acquitted, see art. 20. Rome Statute, supra note 6.
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State that is unwilling to extradite the citizen (in cases where
extradition is not required by a pre-existing agreement), but that would
agree to surrender that individual to the ICC 22
While the idea that an individual may be extradited from one State
to face trial in another is commonplace, the grounds on which such
extraditions and trials may be conducted are evolving with the
development of international criminal law. The concept of universal
jurisdiction, the basis for the Nuremberg trials,2 3 represents one step
toward preventing State boundaries from acting as barriers to
accountability for perpetrators of atrocities such as war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Universal condemnation can
only begin to serve as an effective deterrent if supported by a credible
framework of universal jurisdiction. The extradition proceedings
against General Pinochet in the United Kingdom,24 the arrest of
Hissein Habre in Senegal and the service of Radovan Karadzic with
process in a civil suit in a New York federal court26 provide examples
of the range of actions already available to States and individuals
seeldng to curtail the free movement and indefinite impunity of
international criminals.
With or without the ICC, States can and should enact domestic
legislation that enables them to take advantage of their universal
jurisdiction to try the most serious international crimes. However,
because the political will and institutional capacity to implement and
act on universal jurisdiction may not always be present, the ICC
enables States to pool resources and cooperate in promoting and
ensuring international accountability in practice, and not just in theory.
Within this framework, the principle of complementarity provides the
cornerstone for the ICC's jurisdictional regime. The complementarity
22 Indira Rosenthal helpfully suggested this point.
23 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal (INIT), in Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Ais (London
Agreement), August 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, S2 U.N.TS. 280; see also ifra note 50
24 Regina v. Bartle exparte Pinochet, reprinted in 3S IL.LM. 581, avadable at http /!e. ¢v;
parliament.the-stationery-office.co.ukfpaldl99899ildjudgmtjd990324rpmnol htm Jiast V;tited
Feb. 24,2001).
2-5 See HumA, N RIGHTS VATCH, THE PINOCHET PRECEDENT: How VICTIMS CA,, Pt ?s3tE
HUNA N RIGHTS CRM.IINALS ABROAD 11-12 (2000).
2" Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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regime of the ICC recognizes the primary role of individual States in
enforcing international criminal law. ICC investigations and
prosecutions are intended as a back-up to the exercise of national
criminal jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity (jurisdiction derived from the relevant national laws creating
personal, territorial, and/or universal jurisdiction over these crimes).
The result is a multi-layered jurisdictional regime that is intended to
ensure, first, that international criminals do not enjoy impunity based
on the unavailability of judicial remedies at the national level, and
second, that individuals who are investigated and prosecuted for
international crimes are tried by an impartial tribunal with adequate
due process guarantees.
B. Statutory Provisions Addressing Competing Requests
As noted above, this section will examine, in particular, what
happens when a State party to the ICC receives two contradictory
requests: a request from the ICC to surrender an individual, and a
request from another State (especially a State not party to the Rome
Statute) to extradite the same person. This situation is governed
primarily by Article 90 and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which fall
under Part 9, dealing with "International Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance."
1. Article 90
Article 90 on "competing requests" addresses the possibility that a
State Party (the requested State) might receive a request from the ICC
and from a State not Party to the Statute (the requesting State) for
surrender of the same person.27 Requests are "competing" if fulfilling
27 Rome Statute, art. 102 on "Use of terms" stipulates: (a) "surrender" means the delivering
up of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute; (b) "extradition" means the
delivering up of a person by one State to another as provided by treaty, convention, or national
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one vould prevent a State from fulfilling the other: a State cannot
simultaneously extradite a person to another State and surrender that
same person to the ICC. Despite the potential for a State to receive
mutually exclusive requests along these lines, not all competition is
deemed problematic under article 90. In particular, certain apparently
mutually exclusive requests may in fact come under the heading of
"false competitions" 2 -- that is, situations involving no real conflict
among a requested State's existing obligations, and thus no real
competition.
There are two possible instances of false competition. The first
arises when a requested State has no existing international obligation
to extradite a given person to the requesting State, and the ICC has
deemed the case admissible. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC's
request receives priority in this scenario. 2 A false competition also
arises if the ICC has not yet determined that the case is admissible, in
which event "the requested State may, at its discretion, proceed to deal
with the request for extradition from the requesting State,' 3 but the
requested State may not actually extradite the person to the requesting
State until the ICC has ruled on admissibility.31
Simultaneous requests by the ICC and a requesting State may
create a true competition if and when the ICC determines that the case
is admissible. A true competition also exists when there is an existing
intemational obligation to extradite a person to the requesting non-
State Party and the ICC has deemed the case admissible. In this
situation, the requested State must decide whether to surrender the
person to the ICC or to extradite the person to the requesting State.
The Rome Statute indicates that the requested State's decision whether
to extradite the person to the requesting State or to surrender him or
legislation. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at 1016. Since the ICC is not a foreign junsdiction,
surrender procedures must be no more burdensome and should, if possible, be lcs
burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition "taking into account the distinct
nature of the Court." Id. art. 91(2)(c), at 1054.
2 This terminology has been adapted loosely from approaches to conflicts of law that
distinguish between "true" and "false" conflicts. See LEx BPILMAYER, CoNFL tc OF LAWm 62-
65 (2d ed. 1995).
29 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 90(4).
3' Id. art. 90(5).
3' See id. art. 90(3); Kimberly Prost, Competing Requests, in ComM.E'"TzRY ON THE RoIE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT lOS !, 1037 (Otto Triffiterer ed., 1999),
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her to the ICC should be guided by "all relevant factors, including but
not limited to: (a) the respective dates of the requests; (b) the interests
of the requesting State including, where relevant, whether the crime
was committed in its territory and the nationality of the victims and of
the person sought; and (c) the possibility of subsequent surrender
between the Court and the requesting State."
32
If extradition of an individual to the requesting State and surrender
to the ICC are not sought for the same conduct, then the ICC's request
has priority if the requested State has no existing international
obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State (a false
competition). If extradition and surrender are sought for the same
conduct (a true competition), then the requested State must make a
decision based on factors included but not limited to those enumerated
above, "but [the requested State] shall give special consideration to the
relative nature and gravity of the conduct in question." 34 The goal of
the regime set out in article 90 is not to ensure that all persons
responsible for international crimes are tried before the ICC. Rather, it
is to ensure that they are tried before a competent court and are subject
to protections and penalties that meet international standards.
The following table illustrates the totality of possible competing
requests and obligations upon a requested State with respect to the
surrender of a person under article 90:
32 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 90(6).
33 Id. art. 90(7)(a).
14 Id. art. 90(7)(b).
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Requested State has Requested State does not
existing obligation under have existing obligation
agreement with requesting under agreement with
State to extradite to requesting State to
requesting State. (e.g., extradite to requesting
SOFA 5) State. (no SOFA)
Requests relate to Requested State must Request from ICC has
same conduct. decide vhether to priority. Article 90(4).
Case has been extradite or to surrender (false competition)
determined admissible based on "all relevant
by ICC. factors." Article 90(6).
(true competition)
Requests relate to Requested State may Requested State may
same conduct proceed with request for proceed with request for
Case has not been extradition, but may not extradition, but may not
determined admissible extradite until extradite until admissibility
by ICC. admissibility has been has been determined by
determined by ICC. ICC. Article 90(5). (false
(unprovided-for case competition unless!until
unless/ until case case determined admissible
determined admissible by by ICC)*
ICC)*
Requests relate to Requested State must Request from ICC has
different conduct, decide whether to priority. Article 90(7)(a).
extradite or to surrender (false competition)
based on "all relevant
factors" giving "special
consideration to the




35 A SOFA or "Status of Forces Agreement" is an agreement negotiated among Sutes
setting out the legal conditions governing the operations of the mihtary personnel of one State
Party on the territory of the other State(s) Party.
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*Under article 90(8), if the ICC has determined a case to be
inadmissible, and subsequently extradition to the requesting State is
refused, the requested State shall notify the ICC of this decision so
that, according to rule 186,36 the Prosecutor may act in accordance
with article 19(10) and submit a request for a review of the decision on
admissibility.
In sum, under article 90, impunity is anathema; complementarity is
key, and the good-faith exercise of national jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute serious international crimes is both necessary and
encouraged.
2. Article 98
Article 98, entitled "Cooperation with respect to waiver of
immunity and consent to surrender," contemplates a hypothetical
situation in which the ICC seeks cooperation from a State Party (again
referred to as the "requested State") in the form of the surrender of a
person or property of a third State when such action on the part of the
requested State would conflict with its obligations under international
law. In particular, article 98(1) contemplates a situation in which the
ICC seeks surrender or assistance that "would require the requested
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law
with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State." 37 Article 98(2) addresses a special instance
of true competition: a situation in which a request for surrender from
the ICC overlaps with a pre-existing obligation that the requested State
has under an international agreement with a third State to extradite the
same individual.
36 Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, PCINCC/2000/l/Add. 1, at
87, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/rules/rulefra.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2001).
37 Rome Statute, art. 98(1) reads: "The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender
or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the co-operation of that third State
for the waiver of the immunity." Rome Statute, supra note 6.
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More specifically, article 98(2) envisages the possibility that a
member of a non-State Party's armed forces present in the territory of
a State Party might be subject to a request for surrender by the ICC
that conflicts with the requested State's treaty obligation not to
extradite the person under a State-to-State agreement, typically a
SOFA, between the requested State and the non-State Party 1 (referred
to in this article of the Statute as the "sending State," because it has
sent the individual in question onto the territory of a State Party, for
example as part of a military operation). Article 98(2) provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.3
The reference to the third State in this scenario as the "sending
State" (as opposed to "State not Party to this Statute," the term used in
the other provisions of Part 9) indicates that the drafters of the Rome
Statute were concerned with a particular scenario in article 98: the
possible interference by the ICC with operations conducted by the
armed forces or personnel of a non-State Party in the territory of a
State Party. Note, however, that this "interference" would presumably
consist of deterrence, investigation, and, if necessary, prosecution of
3 The forces of a State Party would be subject to ICC jurisdiction under the Rome Statute,
arts. 12(1) and 12(2). The forces of a non-State Party vould be subject to ICCjunsdiction if
the Security Council referred a "situation" to the Prosecutor pursuant to Rome Statute, art
13(b), or if a non-State Party's forces committed %, ar crimes, genocide, or crmes aamst
humanity on the territory of a State Party, art. 12(2)(a), or a non-State Party that has aecped
jurisdiction, art. 12(3). Absent a Security Council referral, crimes may be investigated by the
ICC following a request by a State Party, arts. 13(a) and 14(I), or on the initiative of the
Prosecutor with the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber, arts. 13(e) and 15. Id
3" Id. art. 98(2). Article 97(c) also refers to instances in vhich executing a request for co-
operation from the ICC "would require the requested State to breach a pre-existing treaty
obligation undertaken with respect to another State," Article 97 does not bar such requests
from the ICC; instead, it obligates the requested State to "consult v ith the Court v, ithout dWay
in order to resolve the matter," which may include finding altemative means of compliance.
Id. art. 97.
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war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in cases where the
sending State or the requested State was itself unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute.
40
What does article 98(2) contemplate in concrete terms? Let's say
that State A has a SOFA with State B that gives State A primary
jurisdiction over certain crimes that a soldier from State A might
commit on State B's territory while stationed there as part of a military
exercise or operation. State A sends troops onto the territory of State
B. While in the territory of State B, several soldiers from State A
engage in a systematic campaign of rape against women of a particular
ethnicity in several remote villages. State B is a Party to the Rome
Statute, and it wants the ICC to try these State A soldiers for crimes
against humanity. State B prefers to surrender the soldiers to the ICC
because State B does not have the institutional capacity to try the
soldiers itself, but it is afraid of the domestic political consequences of
extraditing the soldiers back to State A for trial. State A is not a party
to the Rome Statute. In this situation, in order for the ICC to proceed
with a request for State B to surrender these individuals to the ICC, the
ICC would first have to secure the cooperation of State A for the
giving of consent to surrender, since the SOFA between States A and
B assigns State A primary jurisdiction over the systematic rapes
committed by its own troops on State B's territory.
Because the ICC has the power to indict and try military
personnel, there are concerns that its existence will create excessively
burdensome limits on military discretion. This is why article 98(2)
codifies a certain deference to State-to-State agreements such as
SOFAs, which are drafted and adopted to facilitate military operations
by one State in the territory of another. A UN publication entitled
"Setting the Record Straight" further addresses this concern.
Although it is simply a public information document, and therefore not
legally authoritative, this publication corroborates the validity of a
common-sense reading of the language of article 98(2) as referring to
State-to-State agreements, and in particular SOFAs, as opposed to any
40 The ICC's jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Id. art. I.
This means that the ICC will only investigate and prosecute a case when a State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute the case itself. Id. art. 17.
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other type of international agreement. It makes three important points:
(1) Worries that the ICC will not afford adequate due process
guarantees to defendant soldiers are not a valid objection to its
jurisdiction, as the ICC's standards will most likely be equal to or
higher than those of national civil or military courts;41 (2) Objections
to jurisdiction on any basis other than the requested State's own
willingness to investigate and prosecute the crimes in question
constitute a breach of the requested State's existing obligations under
international law;42 and (3) Under the ICC regime, the deployment of
a non-State Party's troops on the territory of a State Party would
continue to be governed by existing agreements under which the
sendingicontributing State retains criminal jurisdiction over its own
soldiers on such missions.43 This arrangement is a feature of, not a
limit on, the ICC's complementary jurisdiction: the ICC would only
request cooperation or surrender of a person if those States also
possessing jurisdiction proved unwilling or unable to exercise it.44
41 On the issue of potential incompatibility betveen national constitutions and the ICC
Statute, see Human Rights Watch Non-Paper, National Constitutions and the Internatiaral
Criminal Court Statute: Some Issues of Compatibit~', http Jww hrw org/campaignsicJ
prep5/compatibility.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001), For questions about criminal procedare
in the ICTY, see Vincent M. Creta, Comment, The Search for Justice in the Forr:cr
Yugoslavia and Beyond. Analjzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the RnWes
of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formcr Ytugoslalia,
20 Hous. J. l1'T'L L. 381, 395-400, 411 (1998) (raising concerns about the possibihty of
witness anonymity and the European practice of allowing appeals from acquittals). The ICC
Statute endeavors to strike an appropriate balance betv.een the rights of the accused and the
protection of victims and witnesses. See supra note 21.
42 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, arts. 4 and 12, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
51) at 197, U.N. Doe. A139151 (1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (cntercd into force June 26, 197);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, arts I and 5, G A.
Res. 260(111), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U N Doe AiS10 (1943), 73 U.NTSo 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
43 In the event of hostilities, the Contracting Parties to a SOFA vill generally review' the
jurisdictional provisions, and may also exercise the right to suspend the application of an, of
the provisions of the SOFA. See, e.g. Agreement Betv, cen the Parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. 15, 4 U ST 1792.
4 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17.
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3. Synthesis of Articles 90 and 98
A notorious pitfall of drafting by committee is that the obvious
sometimes remains unsaid. The above discussion illustrates the kinds
of concerns and situations that Article 98(2) was intended to address in
the context of Part 9 of the Statute. The use of the term "international
agreements" in article 98(2) should not be construed as in any way
expanding the kind of agreement envisaged as falling within the scope
of this provision: that is, State-to-State agreements such as SOFAs.
The sentence, "[I]ntemational agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court" in article 98(2) refers solely to international
agreements between the sending State and the requested State that
create international obligations for the requested State. If such an
agreement exists between the sending State and the requested State
giving rise to such an obligation on the requested State, then the ICC
may not proceed with a request for surrender of a person "unless the
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the
giving of consent for the surrender. ' '45 This provision is designed to
reduce the incidence of competing obligations upon the requested
State, or at least to establish a procedure for addressing potential
conflicts when these do arise. It is not meant, and cannot legally be
read, to hinder the surrender by a State Party of a person to the ICC
because of any obligations other than those existing between the
sending State and the requested State that are themselves consistent
with customary and conventional international law. Any other
interpretation of article 98(2) would contradict the spirit and purpose
of the Rome Statute, and would defy common sense.
The concerns associated with the deployment of one State's troops
in the territory of another are understandable: a State has a moral and
political obligation to protect its citizens, afortiori those it deliberately
sends into hazardous situations. If SOFAs are designed to guarantee
immunity from prosecution for the most serious international crimes,
then they may be deemed invalid as violating jus cogens norms that
41 Id. art. 98(2).
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prohibit war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.4 6 If, as is
more plausible, they are designed to ensure that a State's soldiers v, ill
be protected from the potentially biased or unfamiliar standards and
procedures of a foreign court (in the requested State), but not from
prosecution and punishment by the sending State, then they are
acceptable, as long as the sending State fulfills its international
obligation to prosecute such crimes itself
The complementary jurisdiction of the ICC enhances international
criminal accountability by enabling the ICC to function as a carrot and
a stick: a carrot to entice national courts to exercise their domestic and
universal jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the most serious
international crimes, and a stick to enforce international criminal law
when national courts are unwilling or unable to do so themselves. In
particular, surrendering a suspect to the ICC may be an alternative to
prosecution by the requested State when the sending State is unwilling
or unable to prosecute. If the sending State is willing and able to
prosecute, then the principle of complementarity will, in most cases,
support the genuine exercise of national jurisdiction by the sending
State over the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. In other words, if
the United States does not want a U.S. citizen to be tried by the ICC, it
need only demonstrate its willingness and ability to try the person
itself.
4 7
The principle of complementarity on its own does not create an
absolute exemption from jurisdiction for the citizens of any particular
State, since the ICC can always make a well-founded determination
that the State is not genuinely committed to investigating and
prosecuting a particular alleged crime. Furthermore, any blanket
exemption for the citizens of one State would seriously undermine the
41 Jus cogens norms are, by definition, non-derogable, and therefore tahe precedence over
any conflicting treaty provisions. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
art. 53, U.N. Doe. AConf. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, rcprited in 8 IL.M 679.
47 U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, vhile insisting on a U.S. eemption from
ICC investigations and prosecutions, has nevertheless acknovledged: "We have demonstrated
over the years wherever there is an allegation of abuse on the part of a soldier we hax. a
judicial system that will deal with it very effectively As long as vwe have a re pceted Judicial
system then there should be some insulation factor [for the United States]." Pamela He ,3,
Pentagon takes strong exception to UN [sic] criminal court, UPI, June 12, 2000, avalable in
LEXIS, U.S. News, Combined File.
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moral legitimacy of the ICC as an institution committed to promoting
and upholding international justice and accountability. As explored
below, the proposed U.S. rule to article 98(2) was intended as the first
step towards creating a blanket exemption for U.S. citizens to the
jurisdiction of the ICC by circumventing the common-sense reading of
article 98(2) as referring to prior obligations of the requested State
towards the sending State under an agreement such as a SOFA. This
Comment argues that any interpretation of the U.S. rule that enables it
to act as such a step is not only illegal (because inconsistent with the
Rome Statute), but also against the longer-term interest of the United
States in preserving its international credibility and promoting a more
encompassing system of individual accountability for the most serious
international crimes.
III. THE U.S. POSITION
The contradictory posture of the U.S. as both a driving force
behind the construction of some type of international criminal court,
and a vociferous opponent to the Rome Statute, is a product of both
structural and psychological factors. On a structural level, the
political, military, and economic strength of the United States in the
global arena means that the U.S. is particularly exposed to politically-
motivated attacks by other States; any new international institution can
thus be viewed, in one perspective, as a possible new forum for such
attacks. On a psychological level, the American psyche historically
has exhibited a peculiar combination of missionary zeal and
isolationist retrenchment. The U.S. attitude towards the ICC
exemplifies this split mentality. This section describes one
manifestation of this attitude: the U.S. strategy during the Fifth
PrepCom to take the first step towards carving out a blanket
exemption for U.S. citizens from the ICC's jurisdiction, as long as the
U.S. remains a non-Party to the Rome Statute.
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A. Background to the U.S. Proposal
The U.S. has a long history of support for international criminal
tribunals. While Churchill "wanted the top 70 Nazis shot on sight"
after World War II, President Truman supported U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Jackson, who argued for a dispassionate hearing to determine
the guilt or the innocence of the accused: "Nuremberg created the
international law precedent for punishing war crimes and crimes
against humanity, irrespective of the national sovereignty protecting
their perpetrators. '48 Later, U.S. Secretary of State Laurence
Eagleburger helped drive the creation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In fact, Secretary Eagleburger
insisted that Slobodan Milosevic, at that time President of Serbia, be
tried for war crimes long before Madam Justice Louise Arbour, then
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, took the step of indicting Milosevie.
'1
In advocating the indictment and prosecution of Milosevic and others
in 1992, Secretary Eagleburger emphasized the importance of ensuring
command responsibility, holding individuals (and especially soldiers
and commanders) accountable for acts and omissions that violate
international law, precluding sovereign immunity for war crimes, and
applying and enforcing international standards to conduct that occurs
outside of international armed conflict.
50
U.S. officials have continually affirmed the need to create a fair
and effective international criminal court. In the words of Da,,id
Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes,
Impunity and retribution are the enemies of our future. Only
through international justice can these scourges be overcome.... Our
common challenge is to ensure that the enforcement of international
criminal law in the 21st century fulfills the expectations of both
those who codified it in this century, and the survivors of Ntarama
48 Geoffrey Robertson, Comment & Analysis Amenrica won t hclp The LIS is oppa st, a
new court that could try the world's mass murderers, GUARDIAN (London), July 18, 2Oto, at
17.
49 See Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State (Oct 5, 1994).
50 See Norman Kempster, US calls for trial of Serbs, Eagleburgcr sa's they must afm'er
for war atrocities, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1992, at 2
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[Rwanda]. 51
Despite these declarations, the U.S. was one of only seven
countries to vote against the Statute for the ICC at the Rome
diplomatic conference.52 In addition, even though the U.S. signed the
Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, U.S. officials continue to refuse
to accept the possibility that a U.S. citizen could ever be haled before
the ICC.
53
While the possibility that a U.S. citizen could be haled before the
ICC as long as the U.S. does not ratify the Rome Statute is extremely
remote, the possibility does, in theory, exist. Since the Rome Statute
51 Ambassador David J. Scheffer, The Future of International Criminal Justice, Address at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, Netherlands (Sept. 19, 1997), http://www.state.gov/www/
global/narcotics law/ 970919_scheffer.html.
52 The seven countries that voted against the Statute have been identified as: China, Iraq,
Israel, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and United States of America. International Service for
Human Rights, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 44 HuM. RTS. MONITOR (1998) http://wvw.igc.apc.org/icc/
html/ishr199810.html (last visited Feb 24, 2001). Some commentators have emphasized that
"[a]lthough the United States voted against the statute, its vote ... does not signal U.S.
opposition to an international criminal court as such, but, rather, concern that certain features
of the statute produced by the Rome Conference may undermine the achievement of other
international goals that the United States believes are no less critical for world order and the
international protection of human rights." Developments in International Criminal Law:
Forward, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1999).
53 See, e.g., Associated Press, War-crimes Treaty Flawed Bush Spokesman Says,
TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, IA), Jan. 3, 2001, at A2; Joan Smith, Hypocrite to the last.
The US president has suddenly signed up to the plan for an international war crimes tribunal,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 3, 2001, at 17 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms as saying: "Well, I
have a message for the outgoing president. This decision will not stand."); Senator Jesse
Helms, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Towards a Compassionate
Conservative Foreign Policy, Address at the American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.aci.org/pastevent/conf01011 .htm. ("First, the Bush Administration
should simply un-sign the Rome Statute. I mean, quite literally, that the Administration
should instruct someone at the U.S. Mission in New York to walk across the street to the UN,
ask to see the treaty document, and then take out a pen and draw a line through Ambassador
Scheffer's name. I think that will send a clear message."). In his recent Senate confirmation
hearing, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that "[W]e have no plans to ask for
ratification of the treaty," to which Jesse Helms responded, "Well, we'll send somebody down
there to strike the signature of that ambassador." Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Confirmation Hearing for Secretary of State-Designate Colin Powell, 106th Cong. (Jan. 17,
2001), available in LEXIS, News Group File, All.
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empowers the ICC Prosecutor to investigate a case without the prior
approval of the UN Security Council, 4 (although the Security Council
may vote to suspend an investigation for up to twelve months at a
time55), the United States would not have a veto on ICC investigations
and prosecutions. A U.S. citizen who committed a war crime,
genocide, or a crime against humanity on the territory of a State Party
to the Rome Statute that a competent national tribunal was unwilling
or unable to prosecute itself could, in theory, be surrendered by the
State Party for trial before the ICC.
56
The possibility that a U.S. servicemember might be prosecuted in a
foreign court is not a new concern for U.S. Department of Defense
officials. 57 To reduce the likelihood of this eventuality, the United
States has negotiated SOFAs with countries in which its troops are
deployed. The SOFA between the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, sets out
provisions for jurisdiction over visiting forces. Under the NATO
SOFA, a U.S. servicemember may be tried in a foreign country for
conduct that violates the law of that country but does not violate the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Conversely, U.S. courts-martial
retain exclusive jurisdiction over conduct that violates U.S. military
law but not the law of the host country. If conduct violates both sets
of laws, then there is concurrent jurisdiction, with the United States
having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in enumerated cases,
including over crimes arising out of actions taken "in the performance
of official duty," and with consideration for U.S. claims in other cases
where the United States views its own exercise of jurisdiction to be of
' Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 15(!).55 Id. art. 16.
' Id. arts. 12(2)(a) (jurisdiction) and 17 (admissibility). In fact, the U.S. citizen in
question might well prefer an ICC trial to a trial in the United States, as the ICC doe not
apply the death penalty. Compare id. art. 77(b) (maximum penalty of life impnsonment ') tvh
10 U.S.C. § SIS (giving general courts-martial composed of a military judge and ive
members jurisdiction to adjudge the death penalty for specified offenses).
57 See generally Robinson Everett, American Servicemcml'crs and the ICC, in THE U..IED
STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CPIMINAL COURT (Sarah B. Sew all & Karl Kaysen, cds,,
forthcoming).
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"particular importance." 58 Civilian dependents and employees who
accompany visiting armed forces remain under the jurisdiction of the
host country, since they cannot be tried by a U.S. court-martial.59 In its
current form, the NATO SOFA does not contemplate the possibility of
competing claims for jurisdiction by an international tribunal and a
U.S. court-martial; as such, NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia are
well within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. 60 The ICTY is meant to deter
and punish war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity,
including those that might be perpetrated against the peacekeepers
themselves.
B. The U.S. and the ICC
The "fundamental objective" of the U.S. in the ICC negotiations
has been, and remains, "to prevent, unless certain conditions are met,
the surrender to or acceptance by the ICC for trial of nationals of non-
party States who are acting under governmental direction and whose
actions are acknowledged as such by the non-party State."'" This
sought-after exemption would even preclude a non-party national from
surrendering voluntarily to the ICC, an unprecedented restriction on
58 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. 7, 4 U.S.T. 1792.
59 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
60 This does not preclude the regular jurisdiction of courts-martial, as seen last summer in
the case of Staff Sgt. Frank J. Ronghi, a member of a U.S. peacekeeping force who pleaded
guilty to raping and murdering an 11-year-old Albanian girl while on duty in Kosovo. See US
soldier pleads guilty to killing girl in Kosovo, UPI, July 28, 2000, available in LEXIS, Wire
Service Stories File; Kosovo Murder Case Referred to Court-Martial, FED. DEP'T & AGENCY
Docs., June 7, 2000, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories File.
61 Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to Foreign Ministers (April
17, 2000) (on file with author). The Deputy Spokesman of the U.S. State Department
reiterated: "Our proposal would prevent the ICC from requesting the surrender or accepting
custody of a non-party national where that national was acting under the overall direction of
its state as long as that state acknowledged such action." Press Statement by Philip T. Reeker,
Acting Spokesman, U.S. Initiative on the International Criminal Court (June 13, 2000),
available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps000613a.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2001).
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the possibility of self-surrender. 62 The U.S. seeks openly to create this
exemption through "a provision in the UN/ICC relationship agreement
and a Rule to Article 98 of the Rome Statute."t 3 This is a two-step
strategy, relying for its acceptance by other States on the tacit
reassurance that the United States will not actively oppose the ICC if
this exception is granted.64 The U.S. position relies on a fundamental
distinction between "responsible" states and "rogue" states or, in more
recent State Department terminology, "states of concern." The stated
U.S. goal is to create a system in which "responsible nations [can]
maintain or restore international peace or security and [can] undertake
humanitarian missions" while making it "extremely difficult for
individuals from rogue states to act with impunity."65 It is troubling
6- Ambassador Scheffer insisted: "The intent of Article 98(2) would be circumventcl if
efforts were undertaken, by whomever, to negate the relevance of the ICC's request ftr
surrender to the requested State with an operation that resulted in the person's amval in The
Hague by other means, either voluntarily or forcibly." David Scheffer, US Statement on
Proposed Rule 9.19(2) at 2 (June 19, 2000) (on file with author). It stretches the imagiation
to infer that the drafters of the Rome Statute sought to prevent the voluntary appearance of
suspects before the ICC. See, e.g., Informal German discussion paper, US Proposal on arlicle
98 as contained in DP.4: A legal analysis qf the proposal and options for a comprruse
formula in the light of the debate in the Working Group on Frtday 23 June 208I A
contribution by Germany for the group qf like-mndcd States at 4 (June 25, 2000). It is irtonic
that the main opposition to delivery of a person to the ICC "by means other than by action of
the requested State," Scheffer, supra at 2, came from a country vath judicial prceed~nts
including United States iv Alvare-zMachaiz, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (forcible abduction of
respondent from Mexico does not prohibit his criminal trial in a court in the United States)
63 Albright, supra note 61. The Rome Statute prouides for the Assembly of States Parties
to conclude a relationship agreement between the ICC and the UN, Rome Statute, supra note
6, art. 2.
64 During the March 2000 PrepCom, the United States floated these steps as two partis of a
single proposal: the "Proposed Text to Supplemental Document to the Rome Treats" (v:htch
the U.S. planned to introduce as part of the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the
ICC in the November PrepCom) and the "Proposed Text of Rule to Article 98 of the Rome
Treaty," included together under the heading US Proposal to the Preparatory Conmnssion for
the International Criminal Court (March 2000) (on file v\ith author). This stands in 1arp
contrast to Ambassador Scheffer's statement in the June PrepCom den~ing the connection
betxeen the two parts of the US plan. Scheffer, supra note 62, at 2.
65 Albright, supra note 61. The U.S. proposal for achieving this goal by carving out an
exemption for U.S. nationals is clearly incompatible with the spint and letter of the Rome
Statute. John Bolton confirms: "On the subject of the [ICC's] jurisdiction over Americ:ns,
the Clinton administration negotiated very hard in Rome to try and carve out exemptions from
the [ICC's] jurisdiction so that states that did not sign the Rome statute could not have their
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that in this picture, it seems to matter less what an individual does than
what country he or she is from.
The Rome Statute also contains elements of a "double standard,"
but one that operates in the other direction: only nationals of State
Parties or individuals who commit war crimes, genocide, or crimes
against humanity on the territory of a State Party are subject to the
ICC's jurisdiction (although all individuals remain susceptible to
domestic laws prohibiting these crimes, and to relevant provisions
enabling national courts to exercise their universal jurisdiction). What
makes a State a "responsible" one under the ICC regime (in contrast to
the U.S. model) is that State's willingness to become a Party to, and to
cooperate with, the ICC.
Philip Reeker, Deputy Spokesman for the U.S. State Department,
has insisted that "[t]he United States seeks a properly constituted ICC
that would not place at risk those individuals from countries that
accept the responsibility of pursuing the noble goals [of maintaining or
restoring peace and security as well as pursuing humanitarian
missions]. 66  Assuming that members of peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions are more likely to be the victims of atrocities
than the perpetrators of them, failure to join the ICC would in fact
place a State's own peacekeeping forces at much greater "risk" than
would becoming a State Party.
The possibility of "politically motivated" and, by implication,
unfounded, prosecutions by the ICC is minimal given the pre-trial
checks and balances, due process guarantees, and stringent selection
procedures for judges and prosecutors.67 Since the UN Security
Council is charged with determining threats to international peace and
security, and since the Security Council retains the power to suspend
ICC investigations in a given situation, international-law-abiding
participants in good-faith peacekeeping operations are highly unlikely
personnel subjected to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It was an issue that
was explicitly raised. It was explicitly rejected." The International Criminal Court and U.S
Military Personnel: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. (July
25, 2000) (statement of John R. Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute),
available in LEXIS, News Group File, All.
66 Reeker, supra note 61.
67 See Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 36 (qualifications, nomination, and election of
judges) and 42 (qualifications, nomination, and election of the Prosecutor).
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to face spurious or unfounded prosecution for war crimes, genocide, or
crimes against humanity before the ICC. While suggestions to the
contrary may simply be the product of misunderstanding or
misinformation, they reinforce a dangerously strident view that the
only appropriate U.S. response to the ICC is resistance and even
outright hostility.
C. The Domestic Political Context
If the ICC's complementarity regime and built-in checks and
balances really do offer strong protections against unwarranted
prosecutions and unfair trials, why are some U.S. politicians so
vehemently opposed to joining the ICC, or to supporting its work in
any way?6 Even the Clinton administration, which was, at least in
principle, supportive of an international criminal court, refused to
accept the slightest possibility that a U.S. citizen might be subject to
the ICC's jurisdiction as long as the U.S. remains a non-State Party.69
President Clinton's statement upon signing the Rome Statute
emphasized that "Court jurisdiction over U.S. personnel should come
only with U.S. ratification of the Treaty."70 Arguments for why the
U.S. should join the ICC have been elaborated in detail elsewhere, and
will not be repeated here.7 1 However, appreciating the nature of U.S.
6s For example, the American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2000, S 27261HoR. 4f#54,
introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and others on June 14, 2000, would prohibit any
U.S. governmental entity from cooperating with the ICC in any respect.
69 See David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Laiv The Unitcd Sttes
and the hIternational Criminal Court, 93 AM. J, INTL L 12, 12 (1999). Ambassmdor Schcffer
repeated in a recent congressional hearing: "We all share the same minimum objeceve,
namely to ensure that members of the U.S. armed forces and US government officials are not
prosecuted before the International Criminal Court %,,hen it is established" The International
Criminal Court: Hearings Before the House Int'l Relations Comm., 106th Cong (July 26,
2000) (statement of David Scheffer, Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes), available in
LEXIS, News Group File, All.
'o Clinton Statement on Signature of the International Crimunal Court Treaty, supra note
13.
71 See, e.g., Lav.yers Committee For Human Rights, The International Criminal Ccurt
The Case for U.S, Support, available at gopherilgopher.ige.ape org.7000rorgs.liccngodocJ
us&icc_lchr.txt (last visited Feb. 24, 2001).
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concerns helps to clarify, if not to justify, the U.S. goal of creating a
blanket exemption from ICC jurisdiction, and suggests why some
other countries try so hard to accommodate what seems to be a clearly
unacceptable U.S. position.
The core U.S. objection to the ICC is that it will unjustly inhibit
U.S. ability to conduct peacekeeping and defense operations around
the world.72 This objection, though articulated in different ways by
different critics, tends to be characterized by two major themes. The
first is a broad, historically entrenched strand of isolationism that sees
American interests as fundamentally threatened by "the stupidity and
ineptitude of old men in the chancelleries of Europe, 7 3 be they
European political leaders and diplomats74 or "wigged judges in The
Hague.' ' 75 The second is a persistent inability to conceive of U.S.
actions as bound by international standards or susceptible to
international scrutiny. For example, the ICTY's jurisdiction over war
crimes in the Balkans was assumed by some Americans to be limited
to jurisdiction over Balkan war criminals, leading "a lot of members
of Congress [to be] quite surprised that this tribunal that was
supposedly set up to try Balkan war criminals had actually been
investigating NATO. 76 In this narrow perspective, international
tribunals exist to mete out sentences to pre-determined outlaws, not to
judge those who are above the law, or at least above the tribunals'
interpretation and application of it.
Highlighting the biases and blind spots of U.S. objections to the
ICC does not negate the depth of resistance to the idea that a U.S.
72 "It is simply and logically untenable to expose the largest deployed military force in the
world, stationed across the globe to help maintain international peace and security and to
defend U.S. allies and friends, to the jurisdiction of a criminal court the U.S. Government has
not yet joined and whose authority over U.S. citizens the United States does not yet
recognize." Scheffer, supra note 69, at 18.
73 Senator Bone, Statement in US Congress (1935), quoted in MANFRED JONAS,
ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICA 1935-1941 105 (1966).
74 See, e.g., The International Criminal Court: Hearing Before the House Comm. on hIt 'I
Relations, 106th Cong. (July 26, 2000) (statement of U.S. Representative Christopher Ff.
Smith, R-NJ), available in LEXIS, News Group File, All. ("[A]bout this willingness to cede
sovereignty. The Europeans have no problem with that, it seems, but obviously we do.").
75 Bolton, supra note 65.
76 Id
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citizen might one day be subject to trial by an international criminal
court. The most salient U.S. objection relates to an inevitable feature
of the complementarity regime, namely that "the ultimate decision
about the ICC's authority is the ICC itself.,7 7 Giving the ICC the final
word on jurisdiction is necessary in order to avoid the possibility that
show trials or sham proceedings will be used either to shield
individuals from criminal accountability, or to deprive them of due
process protections. However, this provision requires a certain faith in
the checks and balances built into the ICC that the U.S., despite its
strong influence on the design of the Rome Statute in general and the
complementarity regime in particular, cannot muster.7
The U.S. has made it clear that it is not yet prepared to make the
leap into "a Rome Statute world."7 The question is: can the U.S.
preserve its credibility in an evolving international society while
continuing to play exclusively by its own rules? For how long can the
U.S. continue to avoid, and even to undermine, the international
standards for individual conduct and mechanisms for accountability
agreed by a majority of other sovereign States?
7 id.
7 Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, has explained "[O]ur concern -
- the United States military, through the United States Military Justice System, prosecutes, and
prosecutes vigorously, well-founded allegations that American military personnel hav e
violated the law of war. We do not need the International Cnminal Court to deal t,,tth that
problem. So that is a non-problem. Our concern is not that there %vill be valid prosecutions of
American military personnel. Our concern, rather, is that, as I said, and as ve have said in -
repeatedly, our concern is with politically motivated prosecutions based not really on serious
allegations of war crimes, but on disagreement vith U-S or other alliance policies, of vhich I
think the rejected allegations with respect to Koso~o are a good example." The Intcrnat.mal
Criminal Court: Hearing Before the House Comm on Int ! Relations, 10Ith Cong. (Jul, 26,
2000) (statement of Walter Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy), arallable, in
LEXIS, News Group File, All.
7 The International Criminal Court: Hearing Before the House Comm- on Int ' Rclatjns,
106th Cong. (July 26, 2000) (statement of U.S. Representative Chnstopher H. Smith, R-NJ),
available in LEXIS, News Group File, All.
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IV. THE FIFTH PREPCOM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The Fifth PrepCom for the ICC was charged with developing draft
texts for the Rules and Elements to be submitted for approval to the
Assembly of States Parties, the body that will oversee the functioning
of the ICC once the Rome Statute goes into effect. The United States
saw the drafting of the Rules of Procedure as a potential opening for
continued attempts to ensure that no U.S. citizen could be haled before
the ICC for crimes committed on the territory of a State Party to the
Rome Statute. In particular, the U.S. delegation focused on article
98(2) as a hook for an expanded interpretation of what kinds of
"international agreements" might act as limits on the ICC's ability to
request the surrender of an individual, without first attempting to
secure the consent of that person's State of citizenship. While such an
expanded interpretation would have constituted an impermissible
modification of the Rome Statute, the desire for consensus in the
PrepCom meant that a tremendous amount of time and energy was
spent trying to accommodate some aspects of the U.S. position. This
section offers an overview of these efforts and an analysis of their
results through the lens of the tension between consistency and
consensus.
A. The Proposed U.S. Rule
Given that the PrepCom faced a June 30th deadline for finalizing
the procedural Rules for the ICC, 80 the June meeting was the U.S.
delegation's final opportunity to include its proposed rule to article 98.
The U.S. proposed rule read as follows: "The Court shall proceed with
a request for surrender or an acceptance of a person into the custody of
'o Deadline established by Res. F(6) of the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. AJCONF.183/10, (July 17, 1998) available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statutc/
finalfra.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001). The Assembly of States Parties will consider and
adopt, as appropriate, the recommendations of the PrepCom. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art.
I 12(2)(a).
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the Court only in a manner consistent with international agreements
applicable to the surrender of the person." '' On the surface, this seems
like an unnecessary restatement of article 98(2), which, it may be
recalled, provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender? "
By distancing the requirement of compliance with international
agreements from the intended scenario of a SOFA governing
jurisdiction over the forces of a sending State, the proposed U.S. rule
sought to open the door to the next step of the U.S. exemption
strategy: shaping the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the
ICC to create an effective U.S. veto over the ICC's exercise of
jurisdiction over any U.S. national.
Up until the Fifth PrepCom, the United States had consistently
presented the rule to article 98(2) as one part of a package that would
create an exemption for U.S. nationals to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 3
However, during this PrepCom, Ambassador Scheffer, the head of the
U.S. delegation, strategically emphasized that the proposed rule to
article 98 (rule 9.19) was independent and separate from the larger
U.S. package deal.3 4 This approach was necessary in order for the
sI PCNICC!2000/WGRPE(9)JDP.4 (June 8, 2000), avatlable at http:/iwww.un orgla; 'icci
prep comm.Jun2000englishinf4e.pdf.
2 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(2). Article 97(c) also refers to instances in %%hich
executing a request for cooperation from the ICC "would require the requested State to breach
a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State." Article 97 does not
bar such requests from the ICC; instead, it obligates the requested State to "consult w'.ith the
ICC without delay in order to resolve the matter," v.hich may include finding alternative
means of compliance. Id.
'3 See, e.g., supra note 64.
s4 Ambassador Scheffer stated: "[T]his proposal for Rule 9,19(2) ... should not be
interpreted as requiring or in any vy calling for the negotiation of provisions in any
particular international agreement by the ICC or by any other international organization or
State." Scheffer, supra note 62, at 1.
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United States to have a chance of succeeding in having the rule
adopted, since virtually no delegation was amenable to the U.S.
package. In addition, however, Ambassador Scheffer made it clear
when he advanced the rule that he had a larger underlying agenda.
85
This underlying agenda or "fundamental requirement" was, and
remains, obtaining a guarantee that no U.S. citizen will be subject to
ICC jurisdiction under any circumstances as long as the U.S. remains a
non-Party to the Rome Statute.
As part of an exemption strategy, the U.S. proposed rule is
inconsistent with the intended scope of article 98(2), and with the
spirit of the Rome Statute. Exempting the nationals of any country
from the jurisdiction of the ICC stands in fundamental opposition to
the ideals of international justice and to the affirmation of universal
jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes.86 The
PrepCom's mandate explicitly forbids inconsistency with the Rome
Statute. The Statute prevails in cases of conflict with the Rules or the
Elements, 87 and the Rules and Elements will have to be approved by
the Assembly of States Parties before becoming guidelines for the
ICC. 88 Discussions during the June PrepCom's formal and informal
sessions centered on how to accommodate U.S. concerns without
adopting language inconsistent with the Rome Statute. Were it not for
the perceived importance of consensus, the imperative of consistency
would likely have prompted rejection of the U.S. proposal outright.
8- For example, he noted: "Regarding the means to accommodate our fundamental
requirement, as well as the common concerns raised about it, we are flexible." Id. at 2
(emphasis added).
86 On universal jurisdiction, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25; REDRESS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR
CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, TORTURE AND GENOCIDE (1999); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 14 PRINCIPLES ON THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (1999).
87 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 51(5).
88 Id. art. 112(2)(a).
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B. Reactions to the U.S. Proposal
Initial reactions to the U.S. rule were voiced at a formal session of
the working group on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence on the
afternoon of Friday, June 23, 2000. A compilation of delegates'
remarks prepared by the Coalition for an International Criminal Court
(CICC) tabulated that, out of forty-five countries that expressed views
on the U.S. proposal, thirty-nine countries (eighty-seven percent)
raised concerns about the incompatibility of the rule with the Rome
Statute.S9 While this would technically make the rule unacceptable
(since the PrepCom has a statutory obligation to ensure that the rules
remain within the bounds of the Statute), the desire for consensus
prompted many countries that objected to the rule to attempt to find a
compromise formulation, instead of rejecting it out of hand.
The U.S. proposal was examined and debated extensively by
delegations after the June 23rd session.'!" In essence, the majority of
States agreed that article 98(2) was intended to address a limited
scenario in which a sending State has an agreement with a requested
State that requires the prior consent of the sending State before its
citizen is surrendered to the ICC.)2 Nevertheless, despite the
widespread agreement that the U.S. rule was contrary to the spirit, and
even the letter, of the Rome Statute, delegations to the PrepCom were
'9 Coalition for an International Criminal Court, NGO Draft -"on-Table'* Brca!joi-. of
Concerns Raised by States on Proposed Rule for ,lrule 93(2) by Issue and Counnti , (June
2000) (on file with author).
95 See, e.g., statements of South Africa, Portugal, and CANZ (Canada, Australia, Ncv
Zealand) in working group on Rules of Procedure and E% idenee (June 23, 2000) (on file v.ath
author).
" The German delegation stated: "It has emerged clearly from this debate [in the vworlain-
group] to what extent the proposal in DP.4 is inconsistent %,,ith article 98. paragraph 2 of the
Statute, and the relevant legal arguments have been clearly spelled out by numerous
delegations." Informal German discussion paper, supra note 62, at 1.
92 As part of the eventual compromise, some of these clarifications were codified in a
special document entitled Suniar, qf statements made in plenarv in connection 1 ia the
adoption of the report of the Working Group on the Rules of Procedure and Evidcnce and the
report of the Working Group on Elements of Crimes, PCNICC2000:INF/4, aradable at
http:!/v.rwv.un.org/law/icc/prepcommfprepfra.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 201) [hercinafter
Summary of statements].
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hesitant to come out against the proposal for fear of alienating the
United States. Although few expect the United States to ratify the
Statute in the foreseeable future, the possibility of active U.S. hostility
towards the ICC provides an incentive for accommodation of the U.S.
position to the full extent permitted by the Rome Statute.
Through informal consultations, the proposal for Rule 9.19.2 was
modified to read as follows:
The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a
person without the consent of a sending State if, under article 98,
paragraph 2, such a request would be inconsistent with obligations
under an international agreement pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required prior to the surrender of a person of that
State to the Court.
The debate over the rule came to a head on the afternoon of
Thursday, June 29, the day before the Rules and Elements were due to
be adopted. The Coordinator of the working group, Phakiso
Mochochoko of Lesotho, suggested incorporating a statement in
connection with rule 9.19.2 in the proceedings of the PrepCom
indicating that the rule "should not be interpreted as requiring or in
any way calling for" provisions in any particular agreement. The
delegates were assured that this statement would suffice to record their
understanding (upon which their acceptance of the rule was based)
that the U.S. would not use the rule as a springboard for a blanket
exemption, as the U.S. had previously indicated it would.93 The
wording of this "proposed understanding" was sufficiently vague to
avoid objection by the United States.
However, not all members of the working group were amenable to
adopting the revised version of the U.S. rule, even with the proposed
understanding. The representative of the CMte d'Ivoire asked for the
floor, apparently with the intention of requesting a vote on the rule.
This move would have called to account the many countries that had
expressed their disagreement with the U.S. rule, but that were willing
to sacrifice (or, at least, to finesse) consistency on the altar of
93 Informal German discussion paper, supra note 62.
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consensus. After a series of mishaps and machinations, 9 the U.S. rule
was finally adopted by the working group without a vote during its
June 29 session. Consensus was achieved, in the sense of reaching
putative agreement without recourse to potentially divisive voting
procedures, and thus with a (somewhat strained) inference of
unanimity. Consistency with the principles of the Rome Statute was,
and remains, mandatory, so the rule to 98(2) does not and cannot limit
the ICC's jurisdiction beyond what was envisaged and agreed upon at
Rome. For this reason, clarifying and documenting the circumstanccs
under which this rule was adopted now is an important step towards
avoiding confusion, and potentially unwarranted impunity, in the
future.
C. Analysis of Reactions
During the PrepCom discussions, the German delegation prepared
a summary of issues that emphasized the limited intent of article
98(2), namely, to apply only to state-to-state agreements such as
SOFAs. 95 While U.S. Ambassador Scheffer rejected the common-
sense view that article 98(2), and thus the U.S. rule, would apply "only
'where an agreement exists between the requested State and the
9- Serendipitously, the Ivoirian delegate's microphone did not %,ork. The Coordinator
called for a halt in the proceedings, and took the highly unusual step of converting the formal
session into an informal session, thereby excluding NGO observers from the ensuing
discussion. The tension was palpable. To the general surprise of the NGO representative3,
who had assumed they would effectively be barred from the rest of the debates, the formal
session was reconvened within a fairly short time, In an apparent attempt to enable discu'Zion
to proceed beyond the C6te d'Ivoire's intervention, France %oiced its concern that the Frcach
translation of the U.S. proposal w.,as not in accordance v.,th the English text. Tunisia,
perplexed, responded that it saw no difference betv\ecn the two versions, and asked France to
explain vhat the problem was. The Coordinator took this opportunity to call on the Frcr~ch-
speaking countries to resolve this issue amongst themselves. With the Francophone
delegations thus diverted, the Coordinator announced that he took it to be the vish of the
working group that the rule be adopted for submission to the plenary session on June 30. No
vote took place.
9- Informal German discussion paper, supra note 62, at I The paper emphasizes that
article 98(2) was intended to apply strictly to status of forces agreements and similar statc-to-
state agreements, not to agreements concluded by the ICC. Id at 2-3.
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sending State,"' equating this allegedly inaccurate characterization
with a "narrow" view of article 98 as relating only to "bilateral
agreements," 96 he misunderstood the crux of the "narrow" view, which
correctly specifies the type of obligation contemplated in article 98(2)
(an obligation on a State) while recognizing that either a bilateral or a
multilateral agreement might give rise to such an obligation. Article
98 acknowledges the possibility that an international agreement of
whatever character (bilateral or multilateral) may place an obligation
on a requested State not to surrender the national of a sending State to
the ICC without the consent of the sending State. This is made clear
in the plain language of article 98(2), which specifies that "The Court
may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements." 97 The pronoun "its" refers to obligations of
the requested State, a point made even clearer by the fact that the term
"the ICC" is repeated elsewhere in the article to avoid confusion.
98
This point was also clarified by the German delegation's analysis,
which lists the elements of the U.S.' proposed rule that are consistent
and inconsistent with the Statute. The only element deemed consistent
with the statute was the U.S. assertion that article 98(2) "does not
contain language which would restrict its application to bilateral
agreements. The concrete example which has been given for a
multilateral agreement which may come within the scope of article 98,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, that is the NATO's status of force
agreement, is pertinent."
99
It is a standard principle of international law that treaties cannot be
binding on third parties without their consent.100 The "international
agreements" must therefore be between the sending State and the
requested State. The international legal personality of the ICC may
allow it to enter into certain agreements (including, most notably, its
Relationship Agreement with the UN, or specific agreements for
96 Scheffer, supra note 62, at 1.
97 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(2) (emphasis added).
98 See Informal German discussion paper, supra note 62, at 2 (supporting this
interpretation).
99 Id
100 Vienna Convention, supra note 46, art. 34.
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cooperation with non-States Parties as envisaged by the Statute).
However, in the absence of a statutory provision contemplating that
the ICC would enter into an agreement with a non-State Party limiting
its capacity to request surrender of a person from a State Party, there is
no clear legal basis for inferring such a power.'
0
'
If the U.S. wishes to preclude the surrender of one of its nationals
to the ICC from a requested State, it will have to have a SOFA with
that State that so provides (which it most likely will have), or it will
have to be willing to investigate and provide a fair trial of alleged war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed by its
nationals on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute.
Ambassador Scheffer's own goal of "eliminat[ing] that potential
confusion in the implementation of Article 98" in deciding which
international agreements it refers to will best be realized by the correct
interpretation of the article as referring to obligations on the requested
State arising from international agreements to which it is a Party.
02
The Samoan delegate, Professor Roger Clark, made a post-
adoption statement during the working group meeting on June 29 that
further highlighted the imperative of construing article 98(2) as
referring exclusively to SOFA-type agreements. 1' 3 In particular, he
emphasized: "I am comforted by the proviso, which provides that this
rule is not in any way -- two words -- requiring or calling for, and does
101 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERN ATONAL Law 691 (4th ed l- 00).
The flawed inclusion of agreements entered into by the ICC in the category of agreements
envisaged under article 98(2) is illustrated by Ambassador Scheffer's ov.n enumeration of
multilateral treaties creating bilateral obligations, all of which are treaties among States -the
1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Protocols, the Chenteal
Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Land Mines Treaty, the Biological Weapons Con'entron,
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, and the 1980 Conventional Weapns
Convention." Scheffer, supra note 62, at 2.
102 Scheffer, supra note 62, at 2.
103 Professor Clark stated:
This has been a creative way to postpone certain very complicated legal issues
The preamble to the Rome Statute contains lofty language about the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a v%,hole Article
98(1) and (2) sits awkwardly with these lofty ideals.,-, So Article 98 should be
strictly construed, not extended by analogy. Its reference to the sending State
suggests limitations on the kinds of agreement [allow.ed].
Roger Clark, Intervention in the Working Group on Rules of Procedure and E~idence (June
29, 2000) (transcribed by the author based on her own detailed notes from this session),
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not authorize, permit, or empower a wide range of such agreements to
be decided on another day."' 104 It is precisely the potential for an "other
day" to provide an occasion for renewed attempts to undermine the
Rome Statute that NGOs and those who support an effective and
credible ICC fear. Future PrepCom meetings must not be used to
exploit further the desire for consensus and to erode the delicate
balance between state sovereignty and universal justice negotiated at
Rome and enshrined in the ICC.
Despite extensive statutory protections against unwarranted
prosecutions by the ICC, and the opportunities for national
investigations and prosecutions under the complementarity regime,
U.S. efforts to carve out a blanket exemption for the actions of its
citizens will not abate. Delegates to the ICC PrepComs are firm in
their resolve to resist attempts to undermine the Rome Statute in
principle, but their best intentions may reward intransigence in
practice. Those committed to ensuring an independent and effective
ICC should remain especially mindful of this tendency during future
PrepComs. The parameters of the Rome Statute are legally binding
and cannot be altered except by official amendment by the Assembly
of States Parties. However, the diplomatic and political compromises
reached at future PrepComs can either facilitate or hinder the future
work of the Assembly and the ICC. Delegates cannot sacrifice
consistency, and they should resist the temptation to compromise
clarity in the name of short-lived comfort or illusory consensus.
David Scheffer warned in a 1997 address given in his capacity as
U.S. Ambassador-at-large for war crimes:
For all of the theory and jurisprudential underpinnings of each
International Tribunal, however, which make these institutions so
intellectually challenging for international and criminal lawyers,
there are operational issues which needlessly hamper the Tribunals'
efficient operations. Unless these issues are resolved, the theory
and precedent essential to a lastingjurisprudence risks being buried
under the weight of bureaucracy.'
5
104 Id.
105 Scheffer, supra note 51. Ambassador Scheffer further insisted in a speech othenvisc
critical of the Rome Statute that: "Lofty rhetoric about justice in the future lacks credibility if
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The unnecessary hindering of international justice may be a
concern of the U.S. delegation; however, too often during the Fifth
PrepCom, it seemed instead to be the core U.S. objective. The U.S.
has a mottled record in this respect: it enacted the Torture Victims
Protection Act while insulating U.S. agents from its reach; 0 6 and it
has called for the trial of Saddam Hussein and others as war criminals
while refusing to support the ICC.1°7 The sensitivities of the U.S.
Defense Department may be understandable, but they are excessive.
The complementarity regime of the ICC, its checks and balances, and
its fair trial standards make ICC-phobia unwarranted and counter-
productive. If the U.S. hopes to be successful in its foreign policy,
from peace-brokering (as in the Middle East) to peace-keeping (as in
Bosnia), it will have to play by its own rules, or at least try harder to
create the impression of attempting to behave with regard for
international standards. This is both a strategic question of credibility
and legitimacy in U.S. foreign policy, and a moral question of
diplomatic honesty, integrity, and reciprocal good faith.
we are not prepared to establish, or to strengthen, credible institutions of international ju-tice
today." David Scheffer, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American SocietN of
International Law (March 26, 1999), available at http:flwwv.igc.org (last .isited Feb 24,
2001).
i Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1192)
(establishing a civil action against an individual vho commits torture or extra-judtcial
execution under color of law of any foreign nation). President Bush noted expresly "I am
signing the bill based on my understanding that the Act does not permit suits for allcged
human rights violations in the context of United States military operations abroad or law
enforcement operations ... which are always carried out under the authority of United Slates
law." President George Bush, STATE.MENT ON SIGNPG THE TORTI.1RE VtcTnim PROTECTIQN, \-T
oF 1991 (March 12, 1992), reprinted in BETH STEPHENS & MIChAEL RT"ER, lTERt.AT1,I1AL
Hu.%i,N RIGHS LITIGATION Eq U.S. COURTS 271,271 (1996)
107 See BBC: Move to prosecute Iraq leaders for war crnies, UPI (London), July 25, 2 00,
available in LEXIS, News Group File; US-funded group hands over uar crimes dossicr on
Saddam, AFP (London), July 25, 2000, available in LEXIS, Ne%'. s Group File
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D. The End of the PrepCom and its Aftermath
The PrepCom's final plenary session, at which the Rules and
Elements were to be adopted, took place on Friday, June 30, 2000.
The day's triumphant atmosphere was noticeably marred by the U.S.
debacle.'0 8 Chairman Philippe Kirsch opened the session by outlining
the adoption procedures: he would present the documents for adoption
and, after action had been taken on them, open the floor to statements
from delegations.
10 9
The Ivoirian delegate presented his concerns regarding the
PrepCom proceedings, especially with regard to the rule to article
98(2). The U.S. rule, he insisted, was "ni plus ni moins qu'une
modification, sinon un amendement, au Statut" -- no more nor less
than a modification, or even an amendment, of the Statute."10 He
'08 The pretense that the U.S. rule was intended to stand alone, as stated by Ambassador
Scheffer and stipulated in the proposed understanding, was shattered on the final morning of
the PrepCom. An Associated Press story released on the night of Thursday, June 29, 2000
confronted readers with the headline: "U.S. Takes War Crimes Exemption Step." Edith
Lederer reported from the UN: "The United States said Thursday it has negotiated a key first
step toward an exemption for U.S. citizens from prosecution by the world's first permanent
war crimes tribunal. U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer, the ambassador-at-large for war
crimes issues, said he is hoping to win final agreement from more than 100 countries when the
commission preparing for the court's operation holds its next meeting in November. "We
know the larger part of our proposal is awaiting debate in November and December, he said
.... Scheffer expressed satisfaction that a rule agreed to by delegates on Thursday would
provide "a gateway" for the United States in November to seek an exemption for the surrender
of U.S. citizens through an agreement with the court." Edith M. Lederer, U.S. Takes War
Crimes Exemption Step (June 29, 2000) available at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/
ap/20000629/us/un intemationalcourt_2.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2001). The awkwardness
created by this shattered illusion of a successful compromise was palpable among the
delegates. Nevertheless, many were reluctant to revisit the wording of the text yet again on
the final day of the conference. "PrepCom fatigue" had set in.
109 The C6te d'lvoire questioned this inverted procedure, which Chairman Kirsch insisted
was simply a suggestion, but one that he maintained was the best way to proceed. After the
presentation of the Elements document by the Netherlands, Chairman Kirsch asked the C6te
d'lvoire if it had anything to add. While the Ivoirian delegate noted that his comments
pertained more to the Rules than to the Elements, he agreed to take the floor at this juncture.
"0 Delegate from the C6te d'Ivoire, Intervention in the plenary session of the ICC
PrepCom (June 30, 2000) (as recorded by the author). See Summary of statements, supra
note 92.
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repeated that article 98(2) does not contemplate that all surrenders of
individuals to the ICC will be subject to the consent of the sending
State, but only requests from the ICC that call on the requested State
to violate an agreement with the sending State. After making sevcral
further observations,"' the Ivoirian delegate concluded by repeating
that rule 9.19 was nothing less than an amendment to the Rome
Statute, and should be voted on as such.
The Rules document was then introduced by the Argentine
delegation. Australia moved to suspend the meeting so that
consultations could take place before a vote. Ambassador Scheffer
made calls on his mobile phone while delegates clustered around the
like-minded States that had spearheaded the compromise
formulation 1 12 to decide what to do next. By the time the meeting was
reconvened, the Ivoirian delegate had been persuaded to retract his
motion for a vote "in the spirit of cooperation" and with a view to
expediting the work of the PrepCom." 3 Given that the "proposed
understanding" would form part of the official record of the PrepCom,
and that article 51(5) of the Statute makes clear that the Statute
prevails in all cases of conflict with the Rules or the Elements, the
Ivoirian delegate agreed to forego a vote. The rule was adopted
without further discussion." 14
1 The lvoirian delegate also insisted that the "proposed understanding" cobbled together
at the last minute did not sufficiently address his concern. Rule 9 19, according to the Ivoinan
delegate, is a "de facto amendment" of the Statute. He insisted that delegates not create' fne
parapluze de l'impunit" - an umbrella of impunity - for certain individuals based on
semantic or grammatical sophistry, as rule 9.19 attempts to do.
'12 The group of "like-minded" States was formed dunng the preparatory %%ork leadmw' up
to the Rome Conference by Western European and Latin American States committed to
establishing an independent and effective Court. The "like-minded" group has grov, n stceAily
(by the end of the Rome Conference, it numbered sinty-seven members) It compmies
countries from all regions, including Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, DenMrar%,
Egypt, Germany, Guatemala, Jordan, New Zealand, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, and
the United Kingdom.
13 The delegate also insisted that the fairness of the ICC depends on the non-
discriminatory exercise of the ICC's competence: It must not always be the same people who
are the judges and the same people who are the accused.
114 The proposed text of rule 9.19.2 was adopted as rule 195(2) in the Finalizcd Draft iet
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, PCINCCY2000dNF/3IAdd.I, at 89, avatlat,&, at
http://w,%,v.un.org/lawlicc! statutetruleslrulefra.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 20011 At this pint
in the proceedings, a number of countries intervened to place on record their understarding
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The "Proposed understanding in connection with Rule 9.19, for
incorporation into the Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission"
reads: "It is generally understood that rule 9.19 should not be
interpreted as requiring or in anyway [sic] calling for the negotiation
of provisions in any particular international agreement by the ICC or
by any other international organization or State."11 5 This statement is
best understood as an expression of the explicit understanding and
condition upon which the adoption of rule 9.19 by the PrepCom was
based: namely, that only obligations created by agreements between
the requested State and the sending State are contemplated by article
98(2) and within the scope of the rule. The United States cannot in
good faith continue to negotiate the "second stage" of the proposed
exemption of its citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The modified U.S. rule adopted by the Fifth PrepCom has been
labeled rule 195(2) in the Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. Recording and understanding the
implications of this rule in conjunction with its drafting history will
prove especially important if a non-State Party ever attempts to use
this rule to shield its citizens from the ICC's jurisdiction when they
have committed genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity on
the territory of a State Party. The discussions of rule 195(2) during the
Fifth PrepCom served to clarify the nature, scope, and purpose of
article 98(2), an article that had not previously been a focus of
attention.1 6 The travaux of rule 195(2) and the form in which it was
adopted lead to the following conclusions:
that rule 9.19 would not in any way expand or modify the compromise already reached at
Rome in article 98(2), as reinforced by rule 9.19's explicit reference to article 98(2). These
included New Zealand, Cuba, Nigeria, Niger, and Portugal on behalf of all 15 members of the
EU. See Summary of statements, supra note 92.
115 "Proposed understanding in connection with Rule 9.19, for incorporation into the
Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission," June 29, 2000 (on file with author).
1 6 Otto Triffterer's extensive commentary on the Rome Statute only contains three pages
on Article 98. The commentary notes that the article as agreed "recognizes protections
flowing from international obligations relating to diplomatic or state immunity [not including
immunity based on official capacity or national law] and those arising from an agreement such
as Status of Forces agreements." Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Cooperation with
respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1131, 1131 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
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(1) Rule 195(2) was accepted on the condition that it stands alone -
- that is, not only that it would be evaluated "on its own merits" in the
context of the PrepCom, but also that it will not form the platform for,
a precursor to, or a portion of, any subsequent expansion of the scope
or purpose of article 98(2), especially for any ends or purposes
inconsistent with those of the Rome Statute.
(2) In cases of doubt or ambiguity, any conflicts or tensions will be
resolved in favor of the Rome Statute, as required by article 5 1(5).
(3) Article 98(2) refers only and exclusively to agreements
between States that place an obligation on the requested State to obtain
the consent of the sending State before surrendering a person to the
ICC. i t7 Article 98(2) also leaves open the possibility for the ICC to
approach the sending State to obtain its cooperation and consent for a
surrender, meaning that such surrenders are not precluded under the
Statute."s
(4) The voluntary appearance of any individual before the ICC is
not prohibited under any circumstances.
(5) The observation that article 98(2) itself seems in tension vith
the purpose of the Statute does not make it a hook for amending,
modifying, or otherwise undermining the ICC: to the contrary, it
requires a very narrow reading of this provision to keep it within the
bounds of the Statute, as required by law.
(6) None of the stipulations provided by the June PrepCom
supplants or erodes the principle of complementary jurisdiction, by
which a competent national court is encouraged to try serious
international crimes to the full extent of its domestic and universal
jurisdiction." 9
U7 In addition, "Article 9S(2) ... does not expressly prohibit the requested state from gil ing
priority to the ICC's request." Amnesty international, The hIternational Criminal OY.:lrt
Checldist for Effective Implementation 24 (June 2000),
11 Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 98(2).
119 With relation to article 98(2), "[s]tates vwhich have signed or ratified the Statute should
not enter into such agreements and should seek to renegotiate existing agreemntms, If the [CC
is precluded by such an agreement from proceeding with the request, then the rcquested *!ate
should exercise jurisdiction over the case or extradite the person to another state able and
willing to do so in fair proceedings." Amnesty International, supra note 117, at 24 Artcle
IS of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes that signatory States are uider
an obligation of good faith to refrain from acts calculated to defeat the object of the trwaty
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(7) The rule to article 98(2) is consistent with the Statute as long as
it is read strictly in conjunction with the article itself, and with the
prevailing understanding of the nature of the agreements at issue
accepted at Rome and clarified during the PrepCom (that is,
agreements between the sending State and the requested State,
creating an international obligation on the requested State).120
If these requirements are adhered to, then rule 195(2) constitutes
an acceptable, if somewhat superfluous, contribution to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence for the ICC. To the extent that the emphasis
on consensus during the Fifth PrepCom managed to keep the U.S.
involved in the discussions without sacrificing consistency, it served a
useful purpose. However, participants in the work of the future ICC
will have to remain vigilant to make sure that States are not allowed to
interpret rule 195(2) as a hook for illegal exemptions to ICC
jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The PrepCom negotiations for the Rules and Elements of the ICC,
and especially the debate over the proposed U.S. rule to article 98(2),
illustrate the interplay between the legal imperative of consistency and
the political imperative of consensus in the development of an
international institution. The precariousness of enforcement
mechanisms in international law means that the effectiveness of a
given international rule or institution will depend largely on its
voluntary and widespread acceptance by States. However, it does not
until they have made their intention clear of not becoming parties. Vienna Convention, supra
note 14. This may, in fact, prohibit any of the 139 signatory States of the Rome Treaty from
entering into agreements calculated to restrict the jurisdiction of the iCC.
120 The observation that this reading of the rule, the only one compatible with the Statute
and thus permitted by it, gives the rule little, if any, independent value (since the rule simply
reaffirms article 98(2)) further belies Ambassador Scheffer's insistence to delegates at the
PrepCom that the rule was intended to stand alone, rather than to serve as a gateway for a
blanket U.S. exemption from the ICC. See supra note 62.
Crafting the International Criminal Court 203
follow that attempts to create a binding regime of international
criminal law must sink to the lowest common denominator.
Consensus purchased at the cost of consistency with the particular
provisions of the Rome Statute and with the general principle of
universal accountability is cold comfort for those committed to the
development of a truly effective system of international justice. The
political positions and constraints of powerful states cannot naively be
ignored, but nor should they be allowed excessively to restrict the
progressive development of international standards that promote and
protect human dignity and other core human values.
The ICC will provide an indispensable backup to national
jurisdictions in deterring, investigating, and prosecuting serious
international crimes. The momentum behind the ICC testifies to the
increasing realization by countries that international norms may
require international enforcement mechanisms, especially where
individual perpetrators beyond the reach of their own domestic courts
are concerned. The frequent observation that an individual vho
commits one murder may face life imprisonment, but another ,-.ho
murders thousands may enjoy impunity, has driven efforts to rectify
this incongruity, especially insofar as it constitutes a by-product of an
international system of sovereign states.
Signing, ratifying, and implementing the ICC provides States wvith
an opportunity to review their existing criminal procedures, and to
ensure that these comport with international standards such as those
relating to due process, the protection of victims and witnesses, and
jurisdiction over internationally recognized crimes. The ICC w,:ill
provide important incentives and support for domestic efforts in future
cases, and it will eliminate the need to create additional ad hoc
international tribunals when domestic legal systems lack the will or
ability to investigate and prosecute these crimes themselves.
One of the most striking features of the ICC is its overwhelming
endorsement by members of the international community.' Neither
moral relativism nor military might ought to justify double standards
when individual criminal conduct has been identified as such by
almost all States in the world. In particular, the "leader of the free
121 See supra note 6.
6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 215 (2001)
world" cannot justifiably and in good conscience exempt its citizens
from the internationally recognized code of conduct embodied in the
Statute of the ICC.
The curious coupling of internationalism and isolationism that has
characterized U.S. foreign policy since America gained independence
from Britain, and the preeminent role of the U.S. military in many
parts of the world today, make the position of the United States unique
in some respects. But uniqueness should not be used to justify
immunity. For too long, the United States has assumed that it alone
has the prerogative of defining who is "in" and who is "out" of the
club of "responsible" countries. The U.S. would be well-advised to
rethink its posture towards other countries and to recognize that, in
order to lead effectively, one must also be prepared to cooperate and,
at times, to follow.
The ICC, although not perfect, represents a significant step
towards the vision of a united international community committed to
deterring and punishing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. President Clinton noted upon signing the Rome Statute that
this action "sustains [the U.S.] tradition of moral leadership."' 122 It
would be dangerous to interpret this position of leadership as a license
for the U.S. to resist international cooperation on any terms other than
its own. Instead, the U.S. should focus on leading by example, by
facilitating the domestic prosecution of international crimes, and by
bolstering, rather than undermining, the credibility and legitimacy of
the ICC.
122 Clinton Statement on Signature of the International Criminal Court Treaty, supra note
